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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
HARRIS BETHERS,
Plai-ntiff and Respo-nd~n.t,
vs.

Case No. 9062

LALIF VlOOD, dba

INDUSITRIAL
c.ONSTRlfCTION COMPANY,
Defen.danl an.d Appellan-t.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT

~~XD

APPELLANT

NA.TURE OF CASE
Plaintiff sottght to r e c o "T e r the sum of
$29,009.90 claimed due hin1 for the performance of
a subcontract entered into ·between himself and the
defendant, whereby the pla"intiff undertook to furnish gravel required in the construction of a highway from East Faria Creek, Utah; to Utah-Arizona
State Line. The defen'dant 'vas at the time under
contract with the L"tah State Road Commission to
build the road in accordance 'vith the pro\risions of
a prime contract.
1
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Defendant counterclaimed and alleged a right
of set-off for a sum in excess of the claim made by
the plaintiff by reason of plaintiff's default, arising from his delay in furnishing the gravel as directed h:\r defendant and as set forth in the contract.
During the cout•se of trial, while defendant
"\Vas presenting h'is caRe, the court ruled as a matter
of lav-vT that the subcontract prevented defendant
from asserting any damages by way of counterclaim.
STATE:\·IENT OF FACTS
On January 16, 1957, defendant, doing business as Industrial Construction ·company, entered
into a contract with the uta~h State Road Commisslion, wherein he undertoo~k to construct a bituminous
surfaced road in Kane County, State of Utah,. between nine miles east of Paria Creek and the UtahArizona ·state L'inc, identified as Project No.. F. L.
P. ·31 (1) and S. P . 1583, of approximat£ly 12. 041
miles in length. Under the terms of the contract,
defendant agreed to furnish labor and materials
for the const1,.uction of the road in accordance with
the drawings, plans, and specifications and addendums atta·ched to and made a part of the contract,
all as set forth in Exhibit 10.

On the 17th day of January, 1957, defendant
entered into a subcontract with plaintiff, Harris
Bethers, whereby the latter undertook and agreed
2
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to furnish the gravel required in the construction
of the highway.. (Exhibit P .. l).
Since some of the provisions of that contract
are in dispute, they will be set forth at length for
the purpose of future reference . Section 3 of the
contract provides;
'~The subcontractor agrees to complete
the several portions and the "\vhole of the work
herein sublet by the time or time following:
(Here insei·t the date or date and if there
be liquidated damages~ state them.)
.Ill

~'De1i,~ery

of materials to keep up as directed, behind grading equipment at all times .
Should ·contractor have to assume charge on
account of delay by subcontractor, the expense
accrue'd therein '"~ill ibe deducted from the
contract price. Contractor to recei~le gra,vell at
site of crushing plant in the bin.'~
Section 5 provides:
~'The contractor and subcontractor agree
to be bound ·by the terms of the Agreement,
the general conditions, drawings~ and specifications as far as applicable to this subcontract, and also by the following. provisions:
* * * The contractor agrees " (k) to make no demand for liquidated
damages or penalty for delay in any sum in
excess of such amount as may be specifically
named in this subcontract.
'' ( 1) That no claim for services rendered or material furnished by the contractor
to the subcontractor shall be valid unless
written notice thereof is given by the con3
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tl~actor to the subcontractor during the first
ten days of the calendar month following
that in which the claim originated.''
Upon signing the subcontract, defendant instrtlcted the plaintiff as to the manner 'in which
gravel was tD be supplied in order that deliveries
of materials would be kept up to the g1·ading equipment (T. 134-135). Plaintiff informed the defendant that he would ·be on the jo·b ready to crush
gTavcl in approximately one week from the date
the subcontract was signed, January 17, 1957 (T.
13'7). Plaintiff did not move the gravel crusher
onto the job until approximately March 4, allthough
defendant began preparing the gracling operation
one month previously (T. 58). At the t'ime the
crushing equipment arrived, approximately 20 per
cent of rough grading had been completed by plain~
tiff (Exhibit 15, Weekly Report No. 5) . Although
the contract spec'ified that defendant was to receive the gravel supplied by the contractor at the
site of the crushing plant in the bin, the ·bin was
not supplied ·by the plaintiff until April 4, 1957,
(T. 61), which required defendant to employ additional equipment in order to handle the gravel as
it was crushed ('T. 63). The defen·dant was to supply
scales for we'ighing the gravel before placing it
upon the road bed; and although the scales were
not placed at the job site until sometime between
February 25, 1957, and March 4, 1957, (T. 100-:.,

4
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1:~1),

the defendant testified that he could ha·ve
had scales available on 48 hours' notice ·but didn't
bring them to the job site until plaintiff determined
'vhere he was going to set his crusher. The scales
weighed between 15 and 20 tons, and plaintiff
\Vished to avoid unnecessary handling (T. 131-1'32).
l\.f r~ Hilton, the State Resident Engineer, testified
that, if the crusher had been in ope1,.a.tion 1Jefore
the scales arrived, the grav·el supplied could have
been stockpiled and then weighed before placing
it on the road (T. 122)~
Considerable ev'idence was introduceld tending
to show the manner in which the construction of the
road \Vas to proceed, through ·Mr. Hilton, Resident
Engineer for the State of lTtah, (Tt 76-7) and also
by Mr. Wood (T. 136). Mr. \Vood, on numerous
occasions, directed the plaintiff to produce gravel
at a faster rate so that it could be kept up with the
grading equipment fT. 59, 139-140, 144, 149, 151,
152, and 153). By June 28, 1957, the grading phase
of the construction had reached a point where the
entire grade of the roadbed \vas ·in a condition to
receive all of the g1,.ave1 (T. 86). At that time the
production of gravel v-.~as approximately four miles
behind the grading, although the ev'iden·ce indicated
that the gravel could reasonably be expected to keep
within 500 to 1000 feet of the grading equipment
(T. 151-152) . Mr. Wood testified that had the

1
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gravel been supplied pursuant to his instructions
and directions to the plaintiff, that he had the equipInent standing available to lay it; and that the road
'vould hav·e been virtually complete at that time
except to mix and lay oil and the ''applying of chips
and final clean-up" ( T. 155-156) ~
Under the terms of the contract, plaintiff was
requ.ired to supply three types of gravel. However,
none of the gravel items were fully ·supplied until
August 10, 1957, when the gravel base item was
completed (Exhibit 15, Report 29).
On the 4th day of December, 1957, the parties
entered 'into an Agreement for the pru"pose of ~'com
pleting two itetns covered ·by this contract (of January 17, 1957), without affecting the rights of either
of said parties under the terms of the contract
dated January 17, 1957" (Exhib'it 4).

On December 21, 195'7, defendant terminated
plaintiff for 'his failure to meet the schedule set
forth in the Supplemental Agi·eernent of December
4, 1957. In this connection the trial court found
that ''on or about the 20:I"d day of December,-1957,
the defendant tvok over performance of the said
Supplen1ental Agreement and incurred expenses in
procuri11g gravel from other sources, which expenses
have been charged against the contract price due
plaintiff" ( T. 162).
6
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During the course of defendant~s case, the
court, on motion of plaintiff's counsel, took under
consideration the effect of Section 3 of the Subcontract, as well as Subsections (k) and (1) of
Sect'ion 5 of the contract ( T. 157 and 158) The
court rule·d as a matter o'f law that the defendant
was not entitled to claim damages as asserterl in
his counterclaim ·by reason of these sections as more
fully appears from the Conclusions of La"v made
and entered by the cout~t herein (T. 164). Judgment
\vas entered for p~aintiff in the sum of $2'7,082.62,
with interest in the amount of $2,349.71, and costs.
4

STAITEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1~
THE COURT ERRED l:t\... RULIKG AS A !\fATTER
OF LA\'7 THAT THE PROVISIONS O~F THE SUB~
CONTRACT AND P AR.TICULARL Y SECTIOl\... 3 . ~ND
.
SECTIOK 5 PRECLUDED THE DEFENDAKT FROM
AS"SER.TTNG THE ALLE·GED DAIVIAGRS AS SET
FORTH IN TTI8 COL"N1'ERCLl\J1'f AND l)fSJVI1'SSING
DEFENDAl\'"'T'S COUNTERCL. ~J)f
.
\VITH 'PREJlJDICE.

A. Damages resulting from delay in performance of
a contract, ur failure to perform it vrith'in the ~ime
agreed, is the actual loss sustained by reason of
the delay.
B. ·Section 3 of the contract does not provide ·an exclusive remedy of defendant, and taking ovet· of the
supple.mental contract by defendant did not constitu tc a waiver of his right to assert damages
against plaintiff, \v·hich arose from delay4
C. Section 3 of the contract does not make provision
7
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for liquidated damages, as ref erred to in Section
5 (k). Thus~ the basis for computing damages is
the actual damage ·suffered by defendant by reason
of the delay.

...

D. Section 5 ( 1) does not require defendant to give
notice to p"la in tiff for damages .so ugh t for delay in
performing the contract.

POIKT II,
THE C-OCRT ERRE·D L\T FINDING THAT PLA.INTIFF Fl~RNISIIED GR . ~
. \.TEL TO THE DEFENDANT
IN ACCORDANCE \VITH THE REQUIREI\fENTS OF
THR ·suBCONTRACT AND THAT PLAINTIFF SUB·STANTIAI~I~Y PERFORIVIED ALL OF THE COVEN.A.NTS AGREED BY "HI~I TO BE PERFORMED .

ARGUMENT
POIN~

I.

THE 'COURT ERRED J)J R"L;LIKG AS A ::\fATTER
OF LA\V THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE SUBCONTRACT AND PARTICUIAARLY SECTION 3 AND
SECTION 5 PRECLUDEID TilE DEFENDAKT FROM
ASSERTING THE AL.LEGED DAMAGES AS SET
FORTH IN THE C-OUNTERCLAIM AND DISMISSING
DEFENDANT'S OOUNTER·CLA'IIVI WITH PREJUDICE~
A.. Damages resulting from delay in performance of
a contract~ or failure to perform it 'vith"in the time
agreed~ is the actua1 Joss sustained by reason of
the delay.

There appears no serious disagreement with
the general rule of law that the measure of damages for delay in the performance of a contract
or the failure to perform it within the time agreed
upon is the actual loss sustained by reason the
1
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··'

~

delay. 15 Am . Jur., Damages, Sec. 47; U. S. v.
Smith, 94 U. S. 214, 24 L. Ed. 115; lJ. S. v. ill-Hller,
113 U~ S. 153t 5 S. ·ct. 380, 28 L. Ed. 946; Spragtte
vt Boyles Bros. Drilli-ng Co., 294 P. 2d 689, 4 Uta·h
2d344 (1956)~
No limitation appears to be placed llpon the
11ature of the damage resulting from delay in the
performance of a contract for which recovery can
be had, provided the claim is proved by satisfactory
evidence.
In the instant case, the defenda11t sought to
claim and recoup against the agreed price the actual
damages sustained by him ·by reason of defendant's
delay4 This, in effect, was the point at issue in the
case of Wisconsin Bridge L\.~ Iron Co. ·v. C·itu of
Alpen.a, 2~38 Mich. 164, 213 N. "\\T. 93 (1927),
Where the plaintiff COTitTacted 'vith the defendant
city to build a bridge an·d submitted t'vo bids show ..
ing different prices for different con1pletion dates.
The city accepted the higher 'bid for faster completion. The contract did not stipulate damages fot~
delay, and the contract 'vas not performed 'vithin
the agreed time. The city vlithheld approximate1y
$2,000.00 of the contract price, which it claimed
as damages resulting from the delaJr. The plaintiff
sued, an·d the city defended, claiming recoupment,
and a jury returned a verdict in favor of the city
based on the difference between the original two
·bid prices.
1

9
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The Appellate court reversed the jury award
because the remedy under the low and unaccepted
bi'd exacted a penalty and was not an ''admeasurement of damages . ',
The court then said:
"If a contract pl~ovides no remedy by
way of liquidated damages, then damages in
recoupment of the contract price must be
established ~y evidence showing actual damages and the amonnt thereof. * * * Failure
of plaintiff to perfonn within the time fixed
in the contract gave the city the right to
claim and l'"ecoup a·gainst the agreed price
the actual damages sustained; such damages~
if any, to 'be esta'blished only by evi'denee
showing the natm"e and extent thereof.''

·The foregoing case followed the established
principle of la'v in the absence of a provision in
the con tract for liquidated damages.
In the instant case the court denied the defendant the opportunity of proving his actual damages,
or of even stating a claim in recoupment against
the plaintiff, and ruled as a matter of law that the
subcontract Sections 3 and 5 (k) and (1) precluded
him from asserting any claim fo1,. damages against
the plaintifft
3 of the Su·bcontract provides:
''The subcontractor agrees to complete
the several portions and the whole of the work
therein sublet by the time or times following:

~section

10
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(Here insert the date or dates; and if there
by liquidated damages,. state them.)
"Delivery o'f materials to keep up as directed, behind grading equipment at all times.
·should contractor have to assume charge on
account of delay by subcontractor, the expense
accrued therein \\Till be deducted f1·om the
contract price. Contractor to receive gravel
at site of crushing plant in the bin."
This subsection of the contract is in part the
language of the partie'S and in part the standardized language of the Standard Form of Subcontract
as approved and copyrighted by the American Institute of Architects. A reading of the entire contract ·clearly indicates that assuming control of the
su·bcontract was not stated as, nor .intended to ·be~ the
exclusive remedy of the contractor in the e,lent the
plaintiff su·bcontractor fell into default, in supplying the material as dit~ected by defendant.
It 'is an establishe·ct pi·inciple of law that when
work is to lbe done by a time certain, the party for
whom the wot•k is to be done, ~y allowing it to continue after that date, treats the contract as still
in force, but waives the materiality o'f time. Sueh
does not constitute a waitler of his right to damages
sustained by reason of the delay.
The early case of Sinclair v.. Talmadg-e~ 35
Barb. 602 (N.Y. 1861),. adopted this rule of law
and it has been generally applied by the courts
throughout America. 'There t~e plaintiff had con11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tracted to build certain stores fo1~ the defendant,
which were not completed within the time specified.
Upon the defendant~s refusal to pay a portion of
the final installn1ent, suit was 'instituted by him
to l"€C01ler the llllpaid pol~tion. The court stated,
page 606:
'QThe defendants, by suffering the plaintiffs to go on after the time limit, and complete the buildings; waived for forfeiture,
which they might have claimed had they exacted it on the day. It was the right of the
defendants to rescind the contract after the
day upon which the work was to have been
done; and had they done so, the plaintiffs
could not have recovered for the work done.
But both parties,. after that treated the contl"act as still in force, and the plaintiff was
suffered to go on under it, and the claim of
the defendants is now limited to damages for
nonperformance as to time, and this claim
has been allowed them.''" See also Foster v.
W-orth-ington, 2 N. Eng. R . 4·74t 59 Vt. 65.
A similar situation existed in the case of Mc111aster State, 108 N.Y. 542, 15 N .. E .. 417 (1888),
where the contractor agreed to furnish and cut stone
for the construction of certain 'buildings. The specifications for the buildings we1~e later altere·d by the
o'vner in violation of the contract so as to require
the building then re1naining unconstructed to be
bt1ilt of ·brick and merely trimmed with stonet The
court observed:

,r.

''It is undoubtedly the rule that where
12
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one party to a contract breaks the same, the
other party may stop and refuse further performance. But, instead of doing so, he may
perform so far as he is permitted, and then
claim the damages he has suffered from the
breach. Here the contractors furnished and
cut the stone for the trimmings~ not under a
new contract,. but under and in performance
of the original contract, and for the prices
therein mentioned~ and this they could do
'~lithout any ratification of the modification
of the contracts attempted by the State.
,;'Further, the fact that a party continues
to perform a contract follo\ying a breach by
the other party, carries \vith it no presunlption that there was a Vv-raivcr of his right of
action for the breach of the contract, by the
n1ere fact that ·he procee<ied v;lith the work
after the breach.H ;."1;Jarkey v. Jl il-u-:a1t-kee, 76
''lise. 349, .4_5 N. \V. 28 ( 1890).
In a case which is strikingly similar to the one
at bar" a su~bcontractor sought to recover fo1· railroad construction work from the general contractor.
The general contractor claimed the right to set off
the expense of doing ceitain \Vork which exceeded
the amotrnts uwing the subconti·actor in rega1·d to
which the subcontractor 'vas in default under the
terms of his contract, and also under an agreement
for an extension of time. ·The couit, in holding that
the general contracto1,.s were ent-itled to the set off
said:
''As to the retained pet~centage, it would
seem that, by the express terms of the con13
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tract bet\veen Sands and Oli\'er and Quigg,
they had the right of set-off, for the contract
says: 'The said t~etained percentage to be held
by the contractor as a guarantee for the faithful performance vf his contract as herein
stipulated." But upon general principles gov·
ern'ing the right of set-off, independently of
the terms of the contract, Sands & Oliver had
the 1·ight to have allowed in their favor any
demand they might establish against Quigg
for breach of his contract vrith them.'' Sands
v. Qu-igg, 111 Va. 476, 69 S. E. 440 (1910).
The U. S. Supreme Court recognized this rule
in the case of Dermott v. Jones, 23 How. (U. S.)
220, 16 L. Ed. 442. The defendant had engaged the
plaintiff to build a build'ing and the contraet called
for installments of $5,000t00 to be pa'id July 1, 1851;
another installment of $5,000.00 to be paid October
1, 1851; and a final payment of $14,000.00 was to
be paid January 1, 1860. The building was to be
ready for use October 1, 1851 . .An action was brought
to recover the second installment of $5,000.00, which
was not paid by October 1, 1851, and the answer
denied that the !building was ready for use on the
due date. The testimony in fact showed it was compteted and accepted December ·4, 1851.
"In such a case, the party cannot recover
the remuneration stipulated for in the contract, because he has not done that which was
to be the consideration of it. Still, if the other
Qarty has derived any benefit from the labor
done, it would be unjust to allow ·him to retain
14
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that \vithout paying anything. The law, therefore, implies a promise on h'is part to pay
such a remuneration as the ·benefit conferred
is really worth . . ~ '' See also Phillips Cons trtf.etion Co. v. Seymottr 91 U. S. 646, 23 L~ Ed.
341, where the court found that t1rging a
builder to go on and the making of part paynlent after failure constitutes a \Vaiver of the
strict perfo1,.mance as to time.
Thus, in the case before the court, the max'imum amount the plaintiff is entitled to recover is
the actual net benefit~ if any, resulting to defendant,
which is the contract price, less the amount of damage occurring to defendant, by reason of plaintiff's
delay in perfot~mance .
..i\. summary of the law on this point is contained in Williston on Contracts, Section 699 (Rev.
1

Ed~).
'~Many

cases have arisen where builders
and contractors ha1le failed to complete the
agreed work ·by the time fixe'd in the contract . . . . If after the time has al1,.eady
elapsed, the owner permitB the ~builder to con. .
tinue to work, even if the contract or materiality of the breach gave the o\vner power
to terminate the contract on such a contingency, his conduct is an election to go on with
the contract rather than to forfeit it, and on
the completion of the work the owner is liable
for the price, though he is entitled to a cross
cla'im for any damages caused by the delay.,
('Citing cases) .
''The true measure of recovery is the
sum stipulated in the agreement, less the
15
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damages sttstained by the failure strictly to
perfo1·m. ·The principle underlies all decisions
in,:rolving consideration of the proper rule for
ascertaining the an1ount recoverable in cases
of substantial performance of contracts for
services or for the furnishing of materials~
All the decisions are referal})le to the underlying principle that the party in default can
never gain by his default, and the other party
can never be permitted to lose by it." 58 Am .
~fur . , "\\!ork & La·bor, Sections 53 and 54.
In the instant case, plaintiff's constant refusal
to "catch up with the contract'' by supplying sufficient gravel materials to permit the graveling portion of the operation to maintain pace with the
grading aspect of the road construction gave the
defendant two altei·na ti ves. First, he could have
terminated the contract and engaged another to
perform it; and under the te1~n1s of the contract~
Section 3, 'vhich merely stated the general rule of
law, the additional expense in so doing could have
been deducted from the contract price. Second, the
defendant could permit the plaintiff to continue with
his contract. Under the prinlciple of law discussed
a·bov·e, defendant would then waive the materiality
of the time of performance, but would be entitled
to offset the damage resulting to himself ·by reason
of the delay against any amounts which became due
for performance unde1,. the contract.
It should be noted in this case that the segment
of road which was being constructed was in a remote
16
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area of the State, and the defendant was undoubtedly faced with a practical problem in obtaining gravel
to complete his contract for the State of Utah. ·The
fact that he permitted the plaintiff to ren1ain on
the jo·b and produce gravel a.t a rate substantially
less than contemplated b~r the parties, did not can. .
stitute a waiver of his right to claim damages by
reason of that delay . As indicated above, the plain..
tiff cannot take ad,rantage of his delay in perform. .
ance, and the defendant should not ·be permitted to
lose by it.
B. Section 3 of the con tract do.es not provide ·an exclusive remedy of defe nda.nt 7 and taking over of the
supplemental contract by defendant did not constitute a waiver of his right to a·ssert damages
against piaintiff, "\Vhich arose from delay.
~4...pparently

the trial court 'vas of the opinion

that Section 3 of the Subcontract provided an exclusive remedy of defendant in event of delay by
plaintiff in the pei'formance of his contract. It
should be noted that a Supplemental agreement was
entered into between the parties December 4, 1957,
(Exhibit 4), for the state(i purpose of completing
two items covei·ed by their original contract of January 17, 195·7, ''without affecting the rights of either
of said parties under the terms of the contract .... '~
The plaintiff failed to perform the supplemental
contract and defendant tet'minated it and took o'Ter
its performance. This action did not wai,re his right
17
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to look to plaintiff for the damage he had suffered
by reason of the delay in performing under the
original contract of JanualJ-T 17, 1957.

The failure to properly analyse the rights of
the dan1aged party as a result of delay in the perfornlance
of a contract '\Vas considered in the case
._
of Fran,kfort-Ba·rr~ett Co. v. U'illiam Prym Co~, 237

F. 21, 28, 29 (2nd Cir. 1916).
The defendant had agreed to supply fasteners
to the plaintiff 'by a certain date and failed to do so.
The parties entered into a later agreement, whereby
the plaintiff agreed to accept delivery of a quantity
of faste11ers according to the terms of the original
contract. The question pi·esented for the appeal court
V{as whether or not the plaintiff waived his right
as pertained to the original breach by reason of the
defendant's failtlre to deliver the fasteners under
the earlier contract.. The court held that there was
not such a waiver.
~"The difficulty in this case has grown
out of the failure to distinguish between the
waiver of a right to treat a ·breach of the contract as a discharge of the contract, and a
wai,rer of the right to recover the damages
occasioned ~by the ·breach. The two rights are
distinct and must not ·be confused. In Page
on Contracts, VoL 3, Sec. 1509, that writer
correctly says that waiver of the l~'ight to
treat a breach of contract as a discharge of
contract liability may take place without a

18
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I

~

\Vaiver of the right to maintain

action for
damages, and the weight of authority is that
it is not such .a waiver. And in Section 510, the
same writer states that acceptance after
breach is not a waiver of right of action is
apparent when it is considered that the party
not in default is often constrained by his
necessities to take \Vhat he can get under his
contract when he can get it.
"The September agreement as set forth
in the reply did not supersede the April contract. That remained unchanged. But the
plaintiff by agt~eeing that the defendant might
deliver in September the fasteners which he
was ·bou11d to deliver in Ap.ril, May, and ~June,
simply waived his right to terminate the contract and to decline to receive any deliveries
in ·September or at any time thereafte1·; provided the defendant made the subsequent deliveries as then promised. There certainly was
no intention on the plaintiff's part to do more
than that~ and he still had his right of action
for the damages he ·had suffered by the failure to delive1~ as promised in the April agree..
ment. Such '\Ve belie·~l·e to be the law in this
country generally . . . .,.,
a11

A case \vith striking sin1ilarities to the one at
bar, both as to the relationship between the parties
and the language of the contractt \\ras before the
''risconsin Supreme Court in Gille-n Co. v. Parke1~
Co.t 170 \'Tisc. 264, 171 N. 'V'l. 61, 174 N. vV. 75
(1919).
The defendant, Parker Company~ was a general
contractor who undertoolc to remo, e certain build7
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ings in the city of 1flillh,.aukee. A number of subcontracts for d-oing part of the work were let, including one such to plaintiff for pile dri,ring and
\vor'k incidental thereto. ·T·he plaintiff 7s contract of
Januar~r 13, 1916, required the work to ·be started
under it on or before January 14, 1916, and to be
c~tnpleted ·by ~,ebruary 16, 1916. The contract pro'rided in part as follows :

''"Should the subcontractor be obstructed
or delayed in the prosecution and the completiol1 of the work by the neglect, delay, or
default of any other subcontractor, .
then
1

4

•

there shall be an allowance of additional time
beyond the date set for the completion of
said ~. ork; . . . and the general contractor
shall a"\vard the additional time to be allo,vcd . . .

,,4 4 the general contractor shall have
the right, at any time, to suspend the whole
or any part Df the work he1·ein contracted
to be done without compensation to the su~
contractor other than extending the time for
r

completing the whole work for a period equal
to that of such suspension."
The work was not completely finished until
August 26. The plaintiff subcontractor claimed
certain datnages, including additional labor costs, ·
extra liability insurance, extra expense of operation
of the steam launch" extra fuel, cost for additional
lines used on drivers, for towing of defendant tugs,
and other charges. Plaintiff had judgment below,

20
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I

.j

....

and the defendant appealed, assigning as error the
allowance of damages, claiming that the contract
between the parties, and particularly the prov'isions
cited above, provided that the only remedy the
plaintiff might ha,re for any delay caused by defendant was limited solely to an extension of time
to be given the plaintiff for the completion of the
work ·beyond the time ·stipulated in the contract.
The court rejected this contention in the fol ..
lowing language:
"~The general rule therefor applied, that
where labor and material are to be furnished
and rendered by the one party and to be paid
for by the other, and the one furnishing the
work, labor~ or material is dependent to some
extent upon the other party performing his
part or providing for the prompt performance
by others of a portion of the work, there a1·ises
by implilcation an obligation on such person,
situated as is the defendant here, not only
to refrain from doing that which will interfere or impede the contractor in the perfor..
mance of his part, ·but that it vnll also do
all that which is reasvna.bly necessary in order
to enable the contracting party to so perform.
For a failure in eithe1,. 1,.espect, damages can
properly be awarded to the person so delayed
or impeded." (Citing cases) (P. 67.)
Similarly, in the case of American Concr-ete
Steel Company v. Ha·rt, 285 F. 322, 327 (2nd Cir.
1922), Hart brought an action against the American ·Concrete Company to recover approximately
21
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$13,000.00 under the terms of a contract between
the parties to do excavation work in connection with
the erection of a building on Staten Island. The third
cause of action was based upon a breach of a pro·
'rision of the contract providing for damages in
event of delay; the fomth cause of action was based
upon a breach of an implied agreement by American
Concrete Steel Company not to hinde1,. ot· delay Hart
in the prosecution of his vlork. The District Court
found the issues in favor of Hart upon ·both causes
of action.
Although Hart agreed, in a portion of the contract which was written into a fo1·m contract, to
perform in such a manner as to cause ll{) delay 'in
the construction of the building, and the printed
form portion of the contract provided that where
Hart delayed in the performance of his contract by
defendant, the time for performance would be ex..
ten9,ed· pi·oviding timely application was madet It
wa.s further mutually agt~eed that if either party
suffered loss through delay of the other,. I·eimbursement would be made.

'The defendant claimed the two provisions of
the contract relating to delay \Vel~e repugnant and
should be ignored by the court. In this connection,
the court in upholding the right of plaintiff to recover damages for delay, o-bserved as follows:
''..... The contract was drawn by laymen,
22
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..;

who probably took the printed form for granted, and did not realize the controversy which
it might provoke4 Ordinarily a contract states
a date or a period of time upon or within
which i L is to be completed; but no such precise limitation is found in the contract4
'~When a contract does fix a date or
period of time, these two clauses are readily·
reconcilable. The first provision is designed
to extend the time for the completion of the
contract by the contractor in case of delay
caused by an o\vner, an architect, or others
than h"imself mentioned in the contract. The
second provision affords to each of the parties
the right to be reimbursed for such damages
as may be suffered ·by the delay of the other.
That such provisions are not repugnant seems
to be settled by G1t.eri11.:i Ston.e Company v.
CaTlin, 240 Ut S. 26.4, 36 ·s. Ct. 300, 60 L.
Ed~ 636, and Gen.oves.e v. Third Aven.tte Rail . .
way Co4, 13 App. Div. 412, 43 N. Y. Supp.
8 affirmed, 162 N. Y. 614, 57 N. E. 1108t""
1

The purpose of including in the contract the
remedy of the nondefaulting party is important in
determining the intended meaning~ In the case of
Nelson v. Pickwick Associated Company, 30 Ill.
App. 333 (1889), the parties entered into a contract
by which the plaintiff undertook to do painting and
glazing of a building being erected for the defendants. The specifications provided that the work
was to be completed on a day certain, and was to
be done so as not to delay other co-operating contractors. The following provision was included in
the contract:
23
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ushould delay be caused by
tractors to the positive hinderance
tractor ·hereto~ a just and proper
extra time shall 'be allowed by

tect . . .'"

other con..
of the con~
amount of
the archi-

Judgment '\Vas entet~ed in favor of plaintiff for
datnages resulting from defendant's delay.
The question presented on appeal was 'vhether
or not the "extra time'' was the only and exclusive
remedy of plaintiff when he was delayed lby other
contractors. The court held that it was not. The provision in the contl~act was for the plaintiff's benefit
and pt~ovided for an allowance of additional time to
him ·but 'vas not in depri·vation of his rights to require the 'vork to be done in readiness fo1· him.
See also the case of illason Tire attd Rubber Co.
v. Ctf..mmin~~Bla-ir Co~, 116 Ohio St. il54, 157 N. E.
367 (1927), "'The1·e plaintiff was permitted to recover dan1ages resulting from delay even though
a provision for extension of time was included in
the c011 tr actt
·T·he provision, in the subcontract in the present case, authorizing defendant to withhold money
fron1 plaintiff in the event defendant found it neces--sary to assume control because of delay by the plaintiff in supplying gravel for the construction of the
1·oad, was obviously written for the benefit of defendant to give him control of the project, and to
enable him to perform his prime contract with the
24
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State of Utah. The prov1s1on was intended as an
additional remedy and was "not in dept~ivation of

his rights".
(~~

Section 3 of the contract does not make provision
for liquidated damagest as referred to in Section
5 (k). Thus~ the basis for computing damages ·is
the actual damage -suffered ·by defendant by reason
of the delay.

On the basis of the trial court's ruling there
was implied a determination that liquidated dam-ages were set forth in the subcontract~ It will be
helpful to refet~ again to Section 5 of the subcontract,.
which provides:
'~The contractor and subcontractor agree
to fbe bound by the terms of the agreement,
the general conditions, drawings and specifications as far as applicable to this subcontract, and also by the following pro,lisions:

''The contractol'" agrees:
H (k) To make no demand for liquidated
damages 01,. penalty for delay in any sum in
excess of such amount as may be specifically
named in the subcontract.''
This language is included in the printed form
of the contract. The entire subcontract was not
written by an attot,ney who was acquainted with
the teehnical usage of terms as used in the printed
form, but by laymen. The only provision in the subcontract even refering to liquidated damages is set
forth in Section 3, which has been quoted above .
That reference is one in small type inserted in
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parentheses which reads: '' (Here insert the date
or dates, and if there be liquidated damages, state
them)." Section 3 makes no attempt to set forth
liquidated damages, nor "\\Tas there any intention to
include such. 'The prime contract had contained in
it a provision for liquidated damages whireh would
be applied against the contractor (defendant)~ However, there was no mention in the subcontract of
liquidated damages or penalty· which was to :be included in it. This becomes even more apparent when
cases are consulted which define the nature of liquidated and unliquidated damages. A technical construction of the typew1·itten language as contained
in Section 3 of the cont1·act, does not inclicate a
provision for liquidated damages.
''Damages are said to be liquidated when
they can be determined from the contract
itself, or from the contract and the rules of
la'v applicable thereto, and where it is necessary to introduce evidence before plaintiff
can pro,re his case, the damages are said to
'be unliquidated.'" Lepman & Haggie v. InterState Produce Cmnpany, 205 IlL App. 270
( 1917).
A rather complete discussion of liquidated damages is contained in the case of Cockrane v . Forbes~
26'7 Mass. 417,. 420, 166 Nt E~ 752, 753: '(Liquidated damages 'mean damages,
agi·eed upon as to amount by the parties, or
fixed by operation of law, or under the correct applicable principles of law made certain
1

w
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in amount by the terms of the contract, or
susceptible of being made certain in amount
by mathematical calculations from factors
which are or ought to be in the possession or
knowledge of the party to 'be charged. Unliquidated damages are those which cannot
thus be made certain by one of the parties
alone., ~,
In the case of Placealla v. Robbio, 47 R. I. 180,
131 A. 64 7 ( 1926), suit was brought ·by a father
and a son as building contractors for a balance of
84,000.00 due on a cont1·.act and for the reasonable
worth of '"extras.'' Defendants sought to 1·ecoup
certain lost rentals, and these with the extras, were
the only items on which the testimony conflicted .
There was no dispute as to the balance due on the
contract, and the amouni to which defendants were
entitled for payments made on 'behalf of plaintiffs.
The trial resulted in a general verdict for the plaintiffs in the approximate sum of $2,200 . 00, whereas
they had claimed a balance due of $2~800f00. 'The
defendants moved for a new ti~ial, a"\rel~ring that the
verdict was against the law, against the evidence,
and that the amount was excessi~le.

''. . . Plaintiff's claim, being contrac. .
tual, is not,. as argued, one for liquidated dam·
ages. It does not arise out of any express
agreement as to the value of the work done.
It arises from the implied obligation to pay
what the extras are reasonably worth. The
damages are unliquidated. 'Liquidated dam27
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ages are those whose amount has been detern1ined by anticipatory agreement between the
parties.' ~unliquidated damages are those not
so fixed but determined after they have resulted.' Cyc. Law Dictionaryt p. 221; Bouvier
La \i\ Dictionary.
"'Plaintiff's damages were made upon a
group of items, some or all of which might be
valid in whole ot~ in part, and the amolUlt of
a reasonable charge for which, in many instances~ was a matter of dispute.
. .. In
point of fact, plaintiff's verdict is for the
total of the items supported by a preponderating evidence. The trial court's I"e.sult, as well
as that of the jui·y, can be reached only by
determi~ing the a!llount of each item .so ~up
ported by the evidence and 'by adding the
se·v·eral i terns together . . . ''
7

In the case of D·u·?tcan. Lumber Company v.
L·eon~rd Lumber Co., 332 Ill. 104, 163 N . E. 416
(1928), the plaintiff company sought and obtained
a judgment for approximately $1,200.00 for lumber
sold to the defendant. Defendant filed a claim of
set-off, although not dit?puting the liability fo11P the
claim sued on but alleged that prior to the sale for
which I"ecovei·y was made, plaintiff contracted to
sell and deli,ler to defendant certain other lumber;
and thereafte1,. plaintiff refused to deliver the lum. .
ber, a11d defendant \vas compelled and did purchase
in the open market lumber of the same grade and
quality in the same amoru1t, paying a sum of approxi. .
mately $4~000.00 more than the contract price, leav28
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ing a balance due to defendant after deducting plaintiff's claim of approximately $2,700400. The set-off
was not allowed and judgment was accordingly entered for the plaintiff. Under the statutes of Illinois,
set-offs, where liquidated were authorized.
The trial court held that the damages claimed
as set-off were unliquidated and could not be set off
in an action at law. In this connection the court
stated at page 416:
'~Defendant contends its claim of set-off
is the difference between the market value of
the lumber at the time the contract was
·breached and the price agreed to be paid for
it, -without any claim of special damages, and
that damages claimed are liquidatedt ..... Defendent contends that the damages sought to
be recovered by it in its set-off are liquidated
damages and cites two decisions of the appellate court that if damages can be ascertained
'by computation or calculated, they are liquidated. This question has been passed upon by
this court in numerous of the cases first above
cited. Bouvier was quoted as defining 'liquidated damages' to be a certain sum due, and
that it must appear not only that something
is due but also how much is due, or the debt
is not liquidated. 'An unliquidated debt is
one which one of the parties cannot alone render certain.' " ·see also Higbie v. R·ust, 211 Ill.
333~ 71 N. E. 10·10, to the same effect.
Any damages resulting to defendant had he
assumed control of the subcontract would have required the introduction of testimony to the same
extent as would be necessa1·y for the defendant to
29
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prove his actual damages. Acco1·ding to the standard
set out in the foregoing cases, there could not be
liquidated da1nages, since there was not agreement
as to the value of the wot~k to be done, nor 'vould
the claims be susceptible of being made certain in
an1ount ·by mathematical calculations or by one of
the parties alone.
Liquidated damages were not intended or provided in the contract.
D.. Section 5 ( 1) docs not rQqui re defendant to give
notice to plaintiff for damages .sought for delay in
p crfornring the contract.

Section 5 ( 1) of the subcontract does not require defendant to give notice for damages sought
through delay but only for materials supplied and
'\Vork performed. The particular subsection states
as follows:
''"That no claim for services rendered or
materials furnished 'by the contractor to the
subcontractor shall be valid unless written
notice thereof is g_iven by the contractor to the
su·bcontractor during the first ten days of
th·e calendar month following that in which
the claim originated.''
As pointed out above, the trial court l~uled as
a matter of law that this subsection construed in
connection with Section 5 (k) and Section 3 pre..
eluded the defendant as a tnatter of la'v from asserting damages by way of counterclaim.
30
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Since the language used; namely~ services rendered, or materials fut~nished, are not technical in
their nature, the ordinary usage of these words is
tt 111 trolling.
In this connection the case of State of Colorado
v. Un-ited States~ 219 F. 2d 474 (lOth ·cir., 19'54)
is helpfuL Thet~e the United ·States sought to recover certain fees and penalties from the State of
Colorado for services t~endered in establishing identity of ownership of liv·estock. The plaintiff argued
that such constituted "stockyard services" within
the Packers & Stockyards Act. The court stated:
''The term 'stockyard services' is broad
and compt~ehensive. Webster's ~ew International Dictionary defines a service as 'any
result of -ttsefttl labor which does not produc·e
a tangible commodity.'" (Emphasis added.)
The defendant,s damages as asserted and set
forth in his counterclaim include such items as the
cost of maintaining standby equipment amounting
to some $12,000 . 00, additional wages to employees~
including pay roll and taxes and insurance in the
sum of $13,138.90, and equipment rentals which
were paid by the defendant which were additional
expenses accruing to him, which would ha-ve been
unnecessary had the plaintiff performed wit~in the
time specified in the subcontract. It is to be noted
that these items are not the result of Husefullabor".
The very fact that defendant is claiming damage
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by reason of them and plaintiff is resisting his
clain1,. is some indication that the damages which
are claimed by the defendant a.re and were not use ..
fuL On the contrary, they wei·e detrimental to all
parties involved4 The substantial portion of the
dan1ages set forth i11 the counterclaim of the plain..
tiff arc of the nature other than services and are
not included, nor 'vere they intended to ·be included
in the subsection cited above. \Vere it possible for
defendant to pro~le any of the foregoing items of
damage, the trial eri~ed in precluding him as a matter of law from doing so.
POINT 11.
THE COlJRT ERRED IN FINDI~G THAT PLAJN..
TIFF Fl}RNISHED GRA \.-~EL T·O THE DEFENDANT
I~ AC-CORDA~CE \VITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF
THE ·suBCONTRACT A~-rD THAT PLAINTIFF SUBSTANTIAT_JJY PERFORI\'IED
~ANTS

AGREED BY

Hl~f

ALL OF THE COVETO BE PESFORME·D.

Under the terms of Section 3 of the Subcontract, plaintiff was required to perform his obligation of producing gravel in such manner that the
deliv"'ery of materials would keep up as directed behind grading equipment at all times.
~Ir.

Hilton, Resident Engineer fo1~ the ·State
of Utah, explained the procedure of road construction under the general contract and indicated that
there a1~e ''some thirty-six items'' included in the
contract ('T. 76) . It is first necessary to prepare
32
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the ground by clearing· it to prepare for building
the subroad. ...~t this stage of construction, other
items of construction can be done; such as, "placing
of pipe" and the ''placing of fence" ( T. 76). At
this point tllc sulbgrade is constructed.
the
~ubgrade is completed, the gravel can be applied.
1\Il'. Hilton indicated that the nature of the soil
in the area was sandy and ,.:rery difficult to keep in
place and required an extreme amount of water.
Mr. \Vood was instructed by Mr4 Hilton that ''as
soon as the subgrade was ready .... the gravel
(was to be) placed on ... so we wouldn't have to
continue to water the subgradc in order to keep
traffic and the wind f1,.om blowing it. Actually,
a lot of it was blow sand and in some cases no
amount of water would continue to maintain that
road . . . and I wanted ·him to place this gra,Tel
right behind the subgrade preparation" (T. 77).
Without the gravel on the SU broad, the traffic would
mire in the sand.
In addition to maintaining the subgi. ade stt·ucture, gravel was required upon the su·bgrade immediately to ~~stabilize the subbase', (T. 77).

vvnen

1

Mr. Hilton indicated that the gravel was to
keep within one thousand feet of the subgradc operation, which included the I·ough grading, so there
would not be interference between the two operations (T. 78-79). He further indicated that for the
week ending March 2, 1957, approximately twenty
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per cent of the subgrade or the rough grading had
been completed; and as of that date, no gravel
had been prepared (·T. 82). 'Thus, approximately
2.4 miles of subgrade had been prepared, a.ll of
'vhich VT.. as ready for gra,rcL On ~June 29,. 195-7, the
rough grading was one hundred per cent completed;
whereas, the gravel was only 68 _per cent complete~
or approximately 4 miles ·behind ( T. 86).
Approximately three weeks after Mr. Bethers
finally ·arri,led on the job, \Vhich would be approximately March 25, 1957, Mr. Hilton, in company
vlith Mr. \Vood (defendant), went to Mr. Bethers
for the purpose of obtaining a 8chedule to obtain the
needed gravel to catch up with the grading. That
con,rersation in part was as follows:

"Q.

Did :'vir. Wood give any instruction
to Mr. Bethers ... with reference to keeping
the gravel up to the grading equipment1
·''A.
''Q.

Yes, he ilid.

''Qt

Now did you have any other con-

'What was that instruction?
''A. \i\Tell, Mr. Wood informed Mr. Bethers that he had been after him to have him
. keep this gravel Dn there and that he wanted
some infoi·mation covering when he could ex..
pect this gravel and he told him since I was
putting pressure to apply on him that he
v1anted some information from Mr. Bethers
as to when this gravel would be available.
(T. 89~90).
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versations 'vith Mr4 Bethers, "'~ith Mr . \\rood
present, relativt~ to the condition of the amount
of gravel that had been, 01· was being delivered?
Yes. On at least two othet~ occasions. Once, of maybe two weeks later than
thisJ \Tt.J0 also went to him again and practically the same thing Vv"'as discussed . . ~"
(T4 90)

"A.

Mr. Hilton also testified to other conversations
between plaintiff and defendant, where the critical
need for gravel \Vas discussed, and Mr. Wood made
demands for material (T. 91)4 He indicated that
Mr. Wood was delayed because of the lack of gravel
('T. 94). Speaking of the period after the gravel
crusher arrived on the job until the end of June,
1957, Mr4 Hilton stated:

''A. \\rell, there o'bviou sly were equipment as well as men waiting for gravel. As
I stated, I have a crew there of which I am
responsible to see that they do their job in
respect to the contractor and in this case I
had to have an inspector available, a weigh
man and a gravel spreader, and I have had
them go out to the crusher site and sit there
and wait as high as two days waiting for
gravel to be crushed tl1at was never crushed.
''Q. Did you nbserve the same condition
with respect to the equipment and men of
Mr. Wood?

Yes." ( T .. 95).
Subsequent to signing the subcontract, plainA..
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tiff and defendant engaged in a conversation 'vhich
took place on the same day the contract was signed.
The parties went over the pl~oposed schedule of operation and jt was estimated that the gravel was
to be .supplied and completed in June or July. The
plaintiff indicated that that would give him plenty
of time in which to complete his contract. The plain..
tiff then estimated that his homly production would
run fl~om 350 to 400 tons of Type 2 and from 250
to 350 of the inch minus material (T4t 135). Mr.
Wood then instructed Mr. Bethers as follows:
"I then told Mr. Bethers - I said, 'Mr4
Bethers, we don1t want a misunde1,.sta.ndi~g
here. It looks to me like our problem at this
point is how we can keep this gradin·g ahead
of our production, what you anticipate this
plant will put out.'' I showed him the plans.
Then we said, 'We've got this section here
that has got ten thousand yards that has to
·be within one thousand feet or a half a point
and then we go down to another point.t We
pointed this out to him that the1·e is one place
~here where we've a half a millifln yards -excuse me, better than one hundred thousand
yards that goes in to one fill. Now how are
we going to keep you satisfied when we get
to this point4 Your crushing plant is going to
·be do'Wll. \V c can't prepare the grade fast
enough. He said, ~That is all right. We can
work on the plant off .and on all the time.
There is always work that you can do on a
plant, so we won't worry about that.' But he
gave us the assurance of every way that I
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know how to get it that gx~avel would be there
when the grade was prepared.~,

At this time Mr. Bethe1,.s indicated on the day
the con tract was signed, which was January 17,
1957, that he would have the crushing equipment
on the site within a weekt
Testimony indicated that the c1,.usher did not

in fact arrive on the site until March 4, approximately a month and a half later" during which
period of time Mr. Wood had made several requests
and inquit'ies of Mr. Bethers that it would lbe on
the jo'b within a day or twot The day following the
arrival of the crusher, Mr . Wood, in the presence of
another, had a conversation with Mr. Betherst in
which he indicated his concern about being behind
schedule and asked Mr~ Bethers what he was going
to do to catch up, and gave him instructions as to
the manner in which it was to ·be produced ('T. 3·9).
In accordance with the contract, Mr. Wood instructed him that the gravel was to be stored in the bin
and was assured that the same would be installed
"in a couple of days.'' (T. 139) Mr. \'load again
explained the problem relative to keeping up with
the machinery and indicated the difficulty that was
being experienced in getting traffic through because
of the absence of gravel on the grade. Again Mr.
\v· ood directed him by telling him to catch up with
his contract, indicating that the gravel was to be
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produced in sufficient quantity to keep up "With
the grading (T. 139-140). Again, on about March
15, 1957, Mr. Wood approached Mr. Bethers and
gave him the following instruction.

''A. I told him that we were building
grade faster than he was producing gravel
and that I wanted him to do something about
it. I wanted him to run the crusher more or
s-uggested that he run a dou ble shift; that
h_e do something a·bout catching up. vrith his
contTact. I didn't have a solution myself. I
couldn't tell hirp. what to do.'' ( T. 140).
1

Mr.· \Vood had another conversation with Mr.
Bethers t~elative· to the condition ·of the contract
during. the latter part of May.- Ml\ Wood indicated
to. 1\fr. B~.thers that. -the job ''a·bsolutely· was clear
out of l'"eason as far as ·keeping up with the contract
\vas conc.erned, and that something absolutely .· j
h~d tO. be done" (T·. .144).. 11r. ~7ood doubted the
ability of·M1'1. Bethers- to catch up with the contract
and suggested that additional equipment be ob..
tained . Mr. Bethers then indicated that he had made
arrangements for another crusher for the purpose of
helping him finish the contract (T . 144). The crusher \Vas not v·btained by Mr. Bethers, and defendant
W'ood made contact with a Mrt Allen who owned
the crusher and sent his own transport for the
purpose of moving the crusher onto the site, and
with the assistance of M1,.. Wood's men the crusher
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was placed in opet~ating condition and operated for
approximately four days (T. 146).
From the time the subcontract ~·as entered
into 'between the parties there was delay on the
part of the plaintiff. First of all, he indicated his
willingness to hav·e the crusher on the jo'b within
a week. It did not arrive for approximately six
weeks, at which time approximately 21/2 miles of
the subgrade was completed4 Even after the ct~usher
arrived, after insistence on the part of 'Mt~.. Wood
and visits from :\1r. Hilton, the Resident Engineer,
the plaintiff failed to produce gravel in sufficient
quantities to keep up to his contract As a matter
of fact, he fell so far behind in the production 'Of his
gravel that by the end of June, v.rhen the entire subgrade had been con1pleted, 'he \Vas over four miles behind. As was noted above, Mr. 'Arood went to him on
numerous occasions in an attempt to resolve the
problem, and suggested that a double shift be run,
which the plaintiff declined to do4 He then suggested
that additional equipment be olbtained, which Mr.
Bethers accepted and then did not follow through.

Mr. Wood, in an effort to bring the gravel production up to the grading, sent his O\Vl1 equipment for
a gravel crusher and placed it in· operating condition. The record is replete with evidence to the
effect that the grave1 production was not only delayed, but the conduct of Mr. Bethers was capricious and unreasonable to an extent as to harass
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the defendant in the performance of his contract.
It is to be noted further that the representa..
tion of gravel production on the part of Mrt Bethers
was that he could produce ·between 250 and 400
tons per hour, depending upon the type of gravel
that was being I"Un. The pi·oduction records which
were kept by the Resident Engineer reflect that this
schedule of production was seldom if ever maintained (See Exhibit 14, various Reports indicating daily production of gravel), and was far less
than the admitted capacity of the crusher.
Had the gravel been pt~oduced as ·Mr. Bethers
indicated that it would be, the difficulty would have
been in keeping the rough gi"ading ahead of the
grav·el production, and not in keeping gravel production up to the grading.

CON·CLUSION
For the foi·egoing reasons, it is respectfully
submitted tllat the Findings of Fact are not supported by fue e'ridence; that the decision of the trial
should be reversed and this case remanded for a
new trial to allow defendant to prove his asserted :~~
counterclaim.

':<

Respectfully submitted,

HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN
JOHN G.. MARSHALL
jfERLIN R. LYBBERT
Attorneys jo1'"
Defendant and Appellant
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